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In the context of a homogenous good industry with Cournot rivalry and technological 
asymmetries among firms, equally skilled workers can be grouped according to their different 
reservation wages. Under decentralized firm-union bargaining, we show that unions may offer to 
firms the option to discriminate wages across such groups of employees and, by that, to achieve 
cost sub-additivity in the equilibrium. We subsequently propose that to combat the emerging 
wage discrimination a benevolent policy maker may activate either taxation, or subsidization, 
policy. Interestingly, while the former policy always entails a welfare loss, a welfare gain may 
emerge under the latter policy, relative to the no policy-wage discrimination status quo. Thus our 
findings suggest that the E.U- antidiscrimination directives may prove to be effective on both 
egalitarian and efficiency grounds.     
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1. Introduction 
A considerable body of European legislation has been put in place over the last thirty 
years in order to combat discrimination (see e.g., Green Paper 2004). More recently, the inclusion 
of Article #13, in the European Community Treaty, following the entry into the force of the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, represented a quantum leap forward in the fight against discrimination at the 
European Union level, in that it empowered the Union to deal with discrimination on a range of 
grounds, including racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. 
That development in turn led, in 2000, to the unanimous adoption by the Council of two 
Directives, #43, the «Racial Directive», and #78, the «Employment Equality Directive», both 
aiming to ensure that everybody living in the European Union can benefit from effective legal 
protection against discrimination.
1  
As in particular regards the European labor markets, the stylized facts show that 
discrimination is indeed witnessed in all the above grounds, thus raising the need for active 
antidiscrimination policies. According to the Eurobarometer Survey (57.0, 2003), in the 15 
Member States, the most often cited ground of discrimination is racial or ethnic  (22%), followed 
by learning difficulties or mental illness (12%), physical disability (11%), religion or beliefs 
(9%), age and sexual orientation (6%). Whilst at the same time people with mental illness and 
                                                           
1 The purpose of Directive #43 (OJ L 180 19/7/2000), is to lay down a framework for combating discrimination on 
the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into a effect  in the Member States the principle of equal 
treatment. With the same view, the purpose of Directive #78 (OJ L 303 27/11/2000), is to lay down a framework for 
combating discrimination, on the grounds of religion or beliefs, disability and age or sexual orientation, as regards 
employment and occupation. In particular, Directive #78  applies to all persons (regarding both the public and private 
sectors), in relation to: (a) Conditions for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation, selection 
criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever is the branch of activity and the level of the professional hierarchy 
(including promotion). (b) Access to all types and to all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced 
vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience. (c) Employment and working conditions, 
including dismissals and pay, (d) Membership of and involvement in an organization of workers or employers, or any 
organization whose members carry on a particular profession, including the benefits provided for by such 
organizations. Directive # 43 also applies to all the above cases and further includes: (e) Social protection, including   2
learning difficulties are thought to be the most disadvantaged group in the labor market (87 %), 
followed by physical disability (77 %), age (71%) and ethnic minorities (62 %). More 
importantly, according to the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit (2003, 35), in Britain the wage 
difference of members of ethnic minority groups relative to their native counterparts is found to 
range from 9 to 150 £, per week, depending on the ethnic group. Key facts such as age, 
education, economic environment and family structure could only explain 5 to 116 £ of this wage 
gap. So it seems that an “ethnic penalty”, in the range of 4 to 34 £ per week, applies. On the other 
hand, according to a questionnaire conducted by the European Trade Union Confederation 
(2003), almost twenty-one, out of twenty-four, national trade unions surveyed agreed that 
migrants and ethnic minorities face higher levels of unemployment, lower pay and slower 
promotion.
2  
The above evidence provides a strong indication that labor market discrimination, as in 
particular regards ethnic minority groups/economic migrants in Europe is significant, and it 
might be related with other than productivity factors. Whilst, various empirical studies have in 
the past assessed discrimination along the same lines, drawing largely on the experience 
regarding “black” versus “white” workers (see e.g., Bergmann and Krause [1972], Swinton 
[1977], Aigner and Cain [1977]).
3   
The theoretical foundations of this ongoing literature (see also, Allanson et al [2000], 
Hinks and Watson [2001]) go back to the seminal papers of G. Becker (1957), and K. Arrow 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
social security and health care. (f) Social advantages. (g) Education. (h) Access to the supply of goods and services 
which are available to the public (including housing).  
 
2 For instance, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK 
ethnic minorities are worse paid and less likely to be promoted.  
3 “Blacks,” including various minority groups, like Latin Americans and American Indians, have found to earn less 
than the majority group (“whites”). Whilst, the most common forms of discrimination on the part of employers were, 
to refuse to employ “blacks” in jobs for which they are qualified, to employ them only at lower wages, or to insist on 
higher qualifications when “blacks” are employed at the same wages as “whites.”    3
(1972). In Becker’s (1957) model, the motivation for discrimination is based on a “taste for 
discrimination,” implying that white employers may be willing to forego some profits to avoid 
the “psychic costs” of interracial contact. As a result, the demand for black workers is ceteris 
paribus lowered, depressing their relative wages. Yet, the trouble with this postulate is that it 
explicitly contradicts the regular view of employers as being profit-maximizers. The idea that 
product market competition will eventually eliminate such a kind of inefficient discrimination led 
to the treatment of imperfect information as a factor that may sustain “statistical” rather than 
“taste” discrimination. In Arrow’s (1972) model of statistical discrimination, employers make a 
hiring test that unveils the worker’s true productivity, while the screening process used to 
determine a worker’s qualifications is costly. Therefore, and since prior expectation of 
productivity differs across groups, wage differentials may arise among workers of identical 
productivity.  
In this paper, we clearly abstain from both those approaches. We instead propose that, in 
the presence of costless screening regarding workers’ qualifications, as well as in the absence of 
any “taste for discrimination,” there is still room for wage discrimination among equally-skilled 
employees. As long as, first, the latter can be ex-ante grouped according to their opportunity cost 
of employment, and, second, the labor market agents unanimously (yet independently) find wage 
discrimination to their best interest. In the context of unionized labor markets, we particularly 
consider that the (equally-skilled) union members can be grouped according to their different 
reservation wages. Then, under decentralized firm-union bargaining, we show that both the firm 
and its union, in each firm/union pair, find wage discrimination to be an equilibrium 
arrangement, if unions are of the utilitarian type. This key result in turn opens an interesting path 
for active antidiscrimination policies. As our relevant findings subsequently suggest, the E.U-  4
antidiscrimination directives may in fact drive benevolent policy makers to combat wage 
discrimination without them (necessarily) confronting a net loss in social welfare.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a structural model 
envisaging a unionized industrial sector where technologically asymmetric firms producing 
homogenous goods compete a la Cournot. Under decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining, and 
in the presence of ex-ante grouping of the sector’s workers according to different reservation 
wages, the postulated sequence of events is subsequently explained. Solving this game in section 
3 we show that (and reason why), in the absence of an active antidiscrimination policy, firm-
specific wage discrimination endogenously emerges.  Based upon these findings in section 4 we 
propose alternative taxation/subsidization policies to cure wage discrimination with an explicit 
view of their welfare effects. Our findings are conclusively evaluated in Section 5.  
 
2. The Model 
The product market of our reference industrial sector X consists of two unionized firms 
which compete a la Cournot in homogenous goods. We assume that each firm produces with 
C.R.S, in only the labor input, given that the deployed capital input is always sufficient to 
produce the good.  Specifically, the production function of each firm is: xi = ki Ni ; i=1,2, where xi 
denotes output, Ni is the number of employees, and ki >0 represents the labor productivity, of 
firm  i. We thus allow for productivity asymmetries among firms and, by normalizing k2≡1, 
k1≡k>1, we assume that this is due to the possession of a labor-saving technology on the part of 
firm1.  
Consumer preferences are represented by a variant of the Dixit’s (1979) quasi-linear 
specification:  2 1
2 ; 2 / ) , ( x x X Z X aX Z X u + = + − = . Thus, assuming that the   5
representative consumer’s budget M is large enough, the demand for the goods of sectors X and Z 
(the rest of the economy) respectively are
Z p
p





=  Where, p is the price of xi 
and  Z p   is the price of the composite good Z. Normalizing pZ≡1, we subsequently derive the X 
sector’s inverse demand schedule:  2 1 x x a p − − = , giving rise to a standard profit formula, for 
each i firm of sector X: 
= Πi ) ( ) ( 2 1 i i i x C x x x a − − −  ;   i=1,2                                                                                                            (1)                        
In the labor market, the workers who find a job within each i firm are by default organized 
into the i firm’s labor union. That is we assume that firm-union bargaining is decentralized and a 
collective agreement struck in firm/union pair i covers any employee in firm i, regardless of 
his/her union-membership status
4. Furthermore, we assume that all workers opting for a job in 
sector X are equally skilled. However, these workers are grouped according to their different 
reservation wages. In particular we postulate that there exist two groups of workers: N0 and Nd 
with reservation wages b and ) ( d b− ; b≥0, d>0, respectively.  In the trade unions literature the 
reservation wage is typically treated to be a weighted average of the competitive wage and the 
unemployment benefit. We moreover consider that a group of workers (Nd) are differentiated 
regarding at least one of these two arguments. Prominent examples here seem to be the economic 
migrants as well as the aged and long-term unemployed workers. They typically face lower 
opportunity costs of employment relative to “regular” workers, and/or, they may not be eligible 
to receive the unemployment benefit. In order to find a job, anywhere, a worker belonging to any 
of those groups would then be willing to accept a wage, even lower than the unemployment 
benefit, being equal to his/her disutility of work. Let next, for convenience, normalize b≡0. It can 
                                                           
4 There is evidence that such an open shop scheme is sustained in a number of European countries, like in Greece,   6
subsequently be postulated that the union’s i objective function is an idiosyncratic variant of the 
Oswald’s (1982) total rents formula
5:  
= i U di di i i N d w N w ) ( 0 0 + +  ; i=1, 2                                                       (2) 
  Given the European Council Antidiscrimination Directives (#43 and, particularly, #78), 
and assuming that discrimination monitoring is perfect (yet, costly), the sequence of events 
arising in the above context is as follows.  
At stage one a policy maker, operating under a balanced budget constraint, handles a set of 
ordinary policy tools (e.g. taxes and subsidies) with the aim to combat wage discrimination in the 
labor market of sector X. Regarding the choice of a particular antidiscrimination policy (AdPX, 
where X   refers to taxes or subsidies applying at the X sector’s level), our envisaged policy maker 
is driven by the following lexicographic objective. 
I.  Activate any AdPX so long as it leads to non-discriminated wages across employees in 
each i firm.  
II.  Choose the particular AdPX : 
max G (AdPX ) ≡{DCS (AdPX) +DU(AdPX )+ DPS (AdPX)  ) ( X AdP C − }                           
Where, given the no policy status quo, the operator D refers to the X-sector-specific derived 
differentials, regarding Consumer Surplus (CS), Union Rents (U), and Producer Surplus (PS), in 
case that a particular AdPX is undertaken, and  ) ( X AdP C  is a measure of the policy’s costs.
6 The 
reasoning behind this objective is that, while we here consider policy makers to be primarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
France, and Spain (see e.g., Hartog and Theeuwes [1992], Vlassis [2003]). 
5 Since the union is utilitarian (e.g. it treats all of its members equally) and b≡0, total union rents appear to be, 
 [N0i-oriented-rents =(w0i –  0) N0i ] + [Ndi -oriented- rents= (wdi –  (0 –  d)) Ndi]. 
 
6 Of course, in case that any AdPX entails a negative G (i.e. a net loss in social welfare), the policy maker should 
choose the one which minimizes – G (AdPX ). Note also that the balanced budget requirement effectively implies that 
any positive C(AdPx)  identifies a  loss in social welfare.   7
driven by the E.U- antidiscrimination directives, we also credit to them a regular benevolent 
attitude.  
At stage two decentralized bargains are conducted in each firm-union pair i. We assume that each 
union retains the power to unilaterally set the firm-specific wage rate, whilst firm-specific 
employment decisions are left to each firm’s discretion.
7  At this stage, given that the prospective 
employees/union members are ex ante differentiated regarding their reservation wage, our 
interest is focused on whether unions will ex post set discriminatory firm-specific wage rates. 
Each i union may thus alternatively opt for,  
●  di i w w ≠ 0  
● ndi di i w w w = = 0  
Where,  i w0  ( di w ) stands for the wage paid to the  i N0 ( di N )-employees/union members, and   ndi w  
denotes a non-discriminatory wage rate. 
At stage three all firms simultaneously and independently adjust their employment/output levels. 
 
3. Endogenous Wage Discrimination  
Solving the game by backwards induction,  at stage three each i=1,2 firm adjusts its 
output xi  so that to maximize its own profits (1), given any level  2 , 1 = ≠i j x  of its rival firm’s output, 
the firm-specific wage scheme resulting from stage two, and AdPX  ≡ i f   ≠ 0, or AdPX  ≡ i f   0 = , 
as an outcome of stage one.
8   
                                                           
7 That is, for analytical convenience, we undertake the monopoly union variant of the right-to-manage hypothesis. 
This is a regular restriction in the union-oligopoly literature, and it is not expected to qualitatively affect our analysis 
(see Petrakis and Vlassis [2004], and the references therein). 
8 Where, 
i f stands for a vector of firm-specific taxes, or subsidies, and 
i f ≠ 0 means that at least one of its elements 
= i fi; 1, 2 is different than zero.   8
Assume for the moment that  . 0 = i f  Then, since )] ( ) ( [ 1 1 01 01 1 d d x N x N k x ≡ + ≡ = , 
) ( ) ( 2 2 02 02 2 d d x N x N x ≡ + ≡ = , the sub-game equilibrium is defined by the vectors: ) , ( 1 01 d x x , 
) , ( 2 02 d x x , which maximize: (1.1), (1.2), respectively. 
− = Π α [( { 1 − − 1 01 d x x )( 2 02 d x x − )]} / ( ) / ( [ )] 1 1 01 01 1 01 k w x k w x x x d d d − − +                                (1.1)            
− = Π α [( { 2 − − 1 01 d x x )( 2 02 d x x − ]} [ )] 2 2 02 02 2 02 d d d w x w x x x − − +                                                (1.2) 
The f.o.cs  yield,
9 
0 ) / ( 2 2 01 2 02 1 01 = − − − − − k w x x x x a d d                                                                                    (3.1) 
0 ) / ( 2 2 1 2 02 1 01 = − − − − − k w x x x x a d d d                                                                                    (4.1) 
 
0 2 2 02 2 02 1 01 = − − − − − w x x x x a d d                                                                                          (3.2) 
0 2 2 2 2 02 1 01 = − − − − − d d d w x x x x a                                                                                           (4.2) 
Subsequently (3.1)-(4.2) can be solved so as to deliver optimal group-specific 
employment/output rules for each firm, in the absence of an active antidiscrimination policy, 
21 / )] ( / ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 2 02 1 01 01 d d w w k w w a x + + − − =                                                                        (5.1) 
21 / )] ( / ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 2 02 01 1 1 d d d w w k w w a x + + − − =                                                                        (6.1) 
 
21 / ] / ) ( ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 1 01 2 02 02 k w w w w a x d d + + − − =                                                                        (5.2) 
21 / ] / ) ( ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 1 01 02 2 2 k w w w w a x d d d + + − − =                                                                       (6.2) 
                                                           





 are negative semi-definite. In consequence, (1.1), (1.2), are concave 
in ) , ( 1 01 d x x ,  ), , ( 2 02 d x x respectively. Therefore, (3.1)-(4.1) and (3.2)-(4.2), are also sufficient conditions for the 
independent maximization problems. 
    9
Rules (5.1)-(6.2) can be also arranged as a regular system of reaction functions     
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( j i j i j i x R x = ,  given the unit cost of production of each firm (e.g., k w w d 2 / ) ( 1 01 + ; 
2 / ) ( 2 02 d w w + ), 
5 / ] 2 / ) ( [ 2 1 01 2 1 k w w x a x d + − − =                                                                                                (7)                        
5 / ] 2 / ) ( [ 2 2 02 1 2 d w w x a x + − − =                                                                                                  (8) 
 The reduced form of (7)-(8) are then seen to be
10,   
21 / )] ( 2 ) / ) (( 5 6 [ 2 02 1 01 1 d d w w k w w a x + + + − =                                                                           (9) 
21 / )] / ) (( 2 ) ( 5 6 [ 1 01 2 02 2 k w w w w a x d d + + + − =                                                                        (10) 
 
Let next consider stage two. Given that firm 1(2) will unilaterally choose its employment 
level  k x k x x N d / ) / ) (( 1 1 01 1 = + =   ) ) ( ( 2 2 02 2 x x x N d = + = so that to satisfy (9) ((10)), union 1(2), 
unilaterally and independently from union 2(1), determines the firm-specific wage contract so 
that to maximize its total rents (given in (2)). As postulated, here each union faces a binary 
choice, whose ingredients are summarized below. 
 
(a) Discriminatory wage rates 
Substituting ( k x / 01 , k xd / 1 )  and  ( 02 x , 2 d x ),  from (5.1)-(6.2) into (2), from the f.o.cs of the 
derived total rents formulas, w.r.t   ) , ( 1 01 d w w   and  ( 2 02, d w w ),  we get the following 
(discriminatory)   wage rates. 
 
                                                           
10 Note that, )] / ) (( 2 ) ( 5 [ 6 1 01 2 02 k w w w w a d d + − + >  guaranties non-trivial interior solutions. For that, however, k  
must be sufficiently small. 
   10
96 / )] 5 1 ( 36 [ 01 k d ak w + − =                                                                                                   (2.1.1) 
96 / )] 5 49 ( 36 [ 1 k d ak wd + − =                                                                                                (2.1.2) 
 
) 96 /( )] 5 ( 36 [ 02 k k d ak w + − =                                                                                                (2.2.1) 
) 96 /( )] 49 5 ( 36 [ 2 k k d ak wd + − =                                                                                           (2.2.2) 
 
(b) Non-discriminatory wage rates 
Subsequently setting  , 0 ndi di i w w w = =  we analogously get the following (non-discriminatory) 
wage rates.   
96 / )] 5 ( 5 36 [ 1 + − = k d ak wnd                                                                                                    (2.3) 
k k d ak wnd 96 / )] 1 5 ( 5 36 [ 2 + − =                                                                                                (2.4) 







=   It then 
proves that the following critical differentials are derived. 
2 2
2 1 12 2 1 01 1 8 / ) ; ( ) ; , ( k d w w U w w w U nd nd nd nd d d = −                                                                    (11.1a) 
2 2
2 02 1 01 12 2 02 1 1 8 / ) , ; , ( ) ; , ; ( k d w w w w U w w w U d d d d nd nd − = −                                                              (11.1b) 
 
8 / ) ; ( ) ; , (
2
1 2 21 1 2 02 2 d w w U w w w U nd nd nd nd d d = −                                                                       (11.2a) 
8 / ) , ; , ( ) ; , ; (
2
1 01 2 02 21 1 01 2 2 d w w w w U w w w U d d d d nd nd − = −                                                                  (11.2b) 
   11
2 2
2 1 1 2 1 01 1 8 / ) ; ( ) ; , ( k d w w w w w nd nd nd nd d d = Π − Π                                                                   (12.1a)
2 2
2 02 1 01 12 2 02 1 1 8 / ) , ; , ( ) ; , ; ( k d w w w w w w w d d d d nd nd − = Π − Π                                                             (12.1b) 
 
8 / ) ; ( ) ; , (
2
1 2 2 1 2 02 2 d w w w w w nd nd nd nd d d = Π − Π                                                                     (12.2a) 
8 / ) , ; , ( ) ; , ; (
2
1 01 2 02 21 1 01 2 2 d w w w w w w w d d d d nd nd − = Π − Π                                                                 (12.2b) 
Differentials (11.1a)-(11.2b) predict that, in the absence of an active antidiscrimination policy, 
each union will independently of what the other union does opt for the discriminatory wage 
contract. Why? The reason is that by doing so each union internalizes the effect of the exogenous 
factor d (which differentiates the reservation wages) so that the remuneration of each one of its 
members to equally contribute to the union’s total rents in the equilibrium. To grasp it note that, 
in case  di i w w = 0  (i.e., under a non-discriminatory wage scheme), a worker belonging to the low 
reservation wage  d N -group would effectively enjoy a “wage premium”  , d  relative to a worker 
belonging to the high reservation wage  0 N -group. Therefore, the rent of an  di N -employee/union 
member would considered to be higher than that of an  i N0 -employee/union member, by as much 
as d. Hence, each union driven by its utilitarian objective will set a discriminatory wage contract, 
, 2 / 0 d w w di i + = to exactly compensate for that difference in group-specific rents.  
Yet, why firms to accommodate such discriminatory wage rates in the equilibrium?  As it is in 
turn predicted by (12.1a)-(12.2b), the reason is that by independently doing so firms enjoy higher 
profits. Interestingly, this happens with no firm changing its employment-output level relative to 
the case of a non-discriminatory wage contract. To check for it, note that under a non-  12
discriminatory wage contract the equilibrium vector  ) , ( 2 1 x x  would be the solution to the system 
of reaction functions, 
5 / ] / ) ( [ 2 1 2 1 k w x a x nd − − =                                                                                                      (13.1)         
5 / )] ( [ 2 2 1 2 nd w x a x − − =                                                                                                          (13.2) 







= , it is obvious that : ) ( ) , ( 0 ndi i di i i w x w w x = As 
expected in Cournot rivalry, so long as the firm-specific unit cost of production remains the 
same, the quantities and the price do not change in the equilibrium.
11 Unlike in the regular case, 
however, here the firms’ profits increase despite that their market shares remain invariant, 
because their total costs become sub-additive in  di N and i N0  via the discriminatory wage scheme. 
This, let us call it “diseconomies of scope” feature of wage discrimination, is explicitly portrayed 
in the following cost differentials. 
) ; ( [ ) ; , ( 2 1 12 2 1 01 1 nd nd nd nd d d w w C w w w C − or )] , ; ( 2 02 1 1 d nd nd w w w C
2 2 8 / k d − =                              (14.1)                         
) ; ( [ ) ; , ( 1 2 21 1 2 02 2 nd nd nd nd d d w w C w w w C − or 8 / )] , ; (
2
1 01 2 2 d w w w C d nd nd − =                                  (14.2)                         
In the background, (14.1)-(14.2) are obtained since firms, driven by the differentials in group-
specific wage rates (e.g., 2 / 0 d w w di i = − ), reallocate their group-specific employment levels so 
that, 
k d w N w w N nd d d d 4 / ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 01 1 = −  ;  k d w N w w N nd d 4 / ) ( ) , ( 1 01 1 01 01 − = −                          (15.1) 
4 / ) ( ) , ( 2 2 2 02 2 d w N w w N nd d d d = −  ;  4 / ) ( ) , ( 2 02 2 02 02 d w N w w N nd d − = −                            (15.2) 
Of course, each firm would earn even higher profits if it could ex-post remunerate each one of its 
                                                           
11 It is this-no variability of unit costs-property of wage discrimination that makes the firm-specific Ui and Πi   
differentials, given in (11.1a) – (12.2b), insensitive to what happens in the (rival) union/firm pair i j ≠ =1, 2. 
   13
employees with di w < i w0 . However, this is not an option for any firm. In such an event, as it can 
be readily checked, the union’s rents would be worsened relative to the non-discrimination case. 
Hence, union i, being the unique input supplier for firm i, by virtue of its monopoly power over 
the wage would credibly switch to ndi di i w w w = = 0 . In effect we suggest that, in the absence of an 
active antidiscrimination policy, each union will offer to its own firm a binary take it-or-leave it 
wage contract scheme. That is, at stage two union i will offer di i w w ≠ 0 , as an option for firm i, 
and  ndi w  (=
2
0 di i w w +
), as an alternative option.   
Proposition 1 summarizes our findings so far. 
 
 
Proposition 1  
a. In the absence of an active antidiscrimination policy, the union of firm i=1, 2, offers to its own 
firm a binary -take it or leave it- wage contract scheme, with the following options. 









= , applying to any employee. 
b. The profits of each i firm increase under a.1., while its employment/output level(s) remain 
invariant, relative to a.2. This is due to the reallocation of employment/production, so that  di N  
increases by exactly as much as  i N0  decreases, leading to total cost sub-additivity in each firm. 
Hence, since both firms independently find a.1. to their best interest, firm-specific wage 
discrimination emerges in the equilibrium. 
 
 
   14
4. Antidiscrimination Policy 
  Under the light of Proposition 1, let now consider antidiscrimination policy. In our 
context that is to search for the equilibrium AdPX  ≡ i f   ≠ 0, according to the policy maker’s 
lexicographic objective (I; II). Recalling that  i f  denotes a vector of taxes or subsidies, the policy 
options are as follows. 
 
4.1. Taxing Wage Discrimination 
As regards the -order I- criterion, the intuitive policy option seems to be a vector of taxes, 0 > i f , 
per unit of  Ndi, imposed to employers i whenever they apply the discriminatory wage scheme 
(a.1), sufficient to nullify the i union’s rent differential derived from independent firm-specific 
wage discrimination. Union i would then never offer the binary wage contract scheme. Yet, as 
regards its welfare consequences (e.g., the-order II-criterion), it is rather evident that such a 
policy would definitely ensue a negative G ( i f ). To see this, simply recall the -non variability of 
unit costs-property of wage discrimination. Since sectoral production will therefore remain 
invariant despite  i f -led nondiscrimination, DCS ( i f ) will be zero, whilst DU( i f ) and DPS ( i f ) 
will be negative. Apart from its “egalitarian” effect (satisfying I), such an active 
antidiscrimination policy would thus distort the decisions of the labor market agents (i.e., firms 
and unions) with no effect on the consumers’ welfare.  
  To derive the above explicitly, we first repeat the backwards induction algorithm (stages 
three and two), in case that at stage one, 
(i)  , 0 > i f  if  di i w w ≠ 0   
(ii)  , 0 = i f  if ndi di i w w w = = 0    15
For tractability assuming that  , 2 1 f f f = =  the profit schedules in the event of discrimination are 
then,  
− = Π α [( { 1 − − 1 01 d x x )( 2 02 d x x − )]} / ) (( ) / ( [ )] 1 1 01 01 1 01 k f w x k w x x x d d d + − − +                 (16.1)          
− = Π α [( { 2 − − 1 01 d x x )( 2 02 d x x − )]} ( [ )] 2 2 02 02 2 02 f w x w x x x d d d + − − +                                 (16.2) 
At stage three, therefore, the group-specific output rules become as follows. 
21 / ] / ) 8 ( ) ( / ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 2 02 1 01 01 k k f w w k w w a x d d f + + + + − − =                                            (17.1.1)                        
21 / ] / ) 13 ( ) ( / ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 2 02 01 1 1 k k f w w k w w a x d d f d − − + + − − =                                          (17.1.2)                         
 
21 / ] / ) 1 8 ( / ) ( ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 1 01 2 02 02 k k f k w w w w a x d d f + + + + − − =                                (17.2.1)                       
21 / ] / ) 1 13 ( / ) ( ) 8 13 ( 3 [ 1 01 02 2 2 k k f k w w w w a x d d f d − − + + − − =                                         (17.2.2) 
Using (17.1.1)-(17.2.2) instead of (5.1)-(6.2), at stage two, we subsequently get the after-tax 
discriminatory wage rates,  
96 / )] 5 1 ( ) 5 1 ( 36 [ 01 k d k f ak w f + − + + =                                                                             (18.1.1)  
96 / )] 5 49 ( ) 5 47 ( 36 [ 1 k d k f ak w f d + − − − =                                                                       (18.1.2)                        
 
) 96 /( )] 5 ( ) 5 ( 36 [ 02 k k d k f ak w f + − + + =                                                                           (18.2.1)                     
) 96 /( )] 49 5 ( ) 5 47 ( 36 [ 2 k k d k f ak w f d + − − − =                                                                  (18.2.2)                        
Note that, though 0 > f  ex-ante raises the unit cost of only the Ndi- production, it would ex-post 
affect both wages (see, e.g., , , 0 dif if w w  relative to,  ). , 0 di i w w  The reason is that if, after the tax, 
firms i would go on with the discriminatory wage contract, they would  decrease (increase) Ndi 
(N0i) according to their group-specific output rules (17.1.1)-(17.2.2). Unions i should therefore   16
have to decrease (increase)  di w  ( i w0 ) so that to adjust their discriminatory wage rates to this, f-










∂ 0 ;  , 2 , 1 = i for k being sufficiently low. Hence, though the f-oriented adjustment 
in the structure of group-specific wages is ceteris paribus beneficial for the utilitarian unions, if f 
is high enough both unions might be willing to abandon it for the sake of higher firm-specific 
employment. The latter is ensuing when  0 = f  for which nonetheless the requirement is that 
unions set the non-discriminatory firm-specific wage rates in the equilibrium. To check for that 
explicitly, (17.1.1)-(18.2.2) can be used to calculate the following critical union rent 
differentials.
12  
) ; ( ) ; , ( 2 1 12 2 1 01 1 nd nd nd nd f d f f d w w U w w w U −                                                                                 (19.1) 
) ; ( ) ; , ( 1 2 21 1 2 02 2 nd nd nd nd f d f f d w w U w w w U −                                                                                 (19.2) 








= R f                                                                                                                    (20.1) 
Where, 
d k d k a k 619 )} 10 71 ( ) 72 180 ( { 1 + − − − = γ  
) 355 2258 ( 14971 1 k k − − = σ   
1
2 2
1 1 212 σ γ ε d − =  
                                                           
12 The outcomes of these differentials turn to be highly complicated expressions in the parameters of our model. 
Since therefore they do not add much to the reader, they are presently omitted. Yet, they are available from the 







= R f                                                                                                                   (20.2) 
Where, 
2
2 619 )} / 10 71 ( ) 72 180 ( { dk k d k a k + − − − = γ   
) / 355 2258 ( 14971
2
2 k k k − − = σ   
2
2 2
2 2 ) ( 21 σ γ ε dk − =  
 
It can be readily checked that  , 2 1 R R f f > for all positive  , ,d a values, and k being sufficiently low. 
Since both (19.1) and (19.2) decrease with f, the imposition of 1 R f f =  will be thus binding for 
both unions. It indeed proves that,   
0 ) ; ( ) ; , (
1 2 1 12 2 1 01 1 = −
= R f f nd nd nd nd f d f f d w w U w w w U                                                                  (20.1) 
0 ) ; ( ) ; , (
1 1 2 21 1 2 02 2 < −
= R f f nd nd nd nd f d f f d w w U w w w U                                                                 (20.2) 
Therefore, as long as  1 2 1 R f f f = =  is credibly announced (at stage one), both unions will be 
deterred to offer the binary wage contract scheme (at stage two), and the non-discriminatory 
wage rates (2.3) - (2.4) will be set in the sub-game perfect equilibrium.  
As regards the policy maker’s -order II- criterion, the following - welfare comprising - 
differentials are then seen to arise. 
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Thus, even ignoring any monitoring and implementation costs of the suggested taxation policy 
(e.g., effectively assuming that , 0 ) ( 1 = = R X f AdP C  hence, the balanced budget constraint is 









f AdP G R X
+
= = −                                                                                                    (24) 
Is there an alternative policy option?  
 
4.2. Subsidizing Discriminated Employment 
  The answer to this inquiry can be traced by recalling (17.1.1)-(17.2.2) and   setting s f − ≡  
therein. That is, by postulating that at stage one a subsidy (instead of a tax) per unit of Ndi is 
announced. We further postulate that this subsidy would be given to employers whatever is their 
firm-specific wage rates’ configuration.  
Then, in the event of ex-ante discrimination it is rather obvious that, if d s − = − , from (18.1.1)-
(18.2.2) we ex-post get,  
96 / )] 5 1 ( 2 36 [ 1 01 k d ak w w s d s + − = = − −                                                                                   (25.1) 
) 96 /( )] 5 ( 2 36 [ 2 02 k k d ak w w s d s + − = = − −                                                                                (25.2) 
Whilst, if it is assumed that unions do not ex-ante discriminate (e.g., opt for 
s di s i s ndi w w w − − − = = 0 ;2 , 1 = i ), it analogously proves that, as expected, under the d s f − = − ≡  
regime we ex-post get the same as above firm-specific wage configuration,  
96 / )] 5 1 ( 2 36 [ 1 k d ak w s nd + − = −                                                                                                (26.1) 
) 96 /( )] 5 ( 2 36 [ 2 k k d ak w s nd + − = −                                                                                             (26.2) 
                                                           
13 Note that, apart from any expenditures needed to detect discrimination and thus be able to tax the discriminating 
firms (: monitoring and implementation costs), the policy maker incurs no other costs from the suggested taxation   19
Our intuition on this result can once more be enlightened by means of (17.1.1)-(18.2.2). Note 
now that, if s f − ≡  and firms i operate under the discriminatory wage contracts, they would this 
time increase (decrease) Ndi (N0i), according to their group-specific output rules. Unions i should 
thus have to increase (decrease)  di w  ( i w0 ), and it simply proves that this adjustment runs all the 
way, up to non-discrimination among  di w  and i w0 , if d s − = − . The emerging equilibrium can be 
also assured by means of the following critical union rent differentials. 
2
2
2 1 12 2 1 01 1 8
) (
) ; ( ) ; , (
k
s d
w w U w w w U s nd s nd s nd s nd s d s s d
−
= − − − − − − − −                                                      (27) 
8
) (
) ; ( ) ; , (
2
1 2 21 1 2 02 2
s d
w w U w w w U s nd s nd s nd s nd s d s s d
−
= −                                                              (28) 
As (26)-(27) clearly dictate, if d s − = − , both unions will have no incentive to independently 
deviate from non-discrimination. Hence, the unions will definitely set the non-discriminatory 
firm-specific wage rates (24a)-(25a) in the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
The -welfare comprising- differentials, arising from the suggested subsidization policy, are 
subsequently seen to be as follows.  
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policy. Nor she/he collects any tax revenues in the (non-discriminatory) equilibrium.     20
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                                         (31) 
 
Recall, nonetheless, that the policy maker operates under a balanced budget constraint. He/she 
will therefore have to bear the costs of financing the subsidy in the equilibrium. It thus proves 
that, apart from any monitoring and implementation costs, the suggested subsidization policy 
would entail a cost equal to, 
= = − = ∑
=
− ) ( ) (
2
1 i
s ndi di x w N d d AdP C   2
2
1008
]} 50 ) 1 ( 619 [ ) 1 ( 90 {
k
k k d k ak d − + + +
                              (32) 
Yet, by summing up (29)-(32), it interestingly follows that a (gross) welfare gain is ensuing in the 
equilibrium: 
= − = ) ( d AdP G X 2
2
56448
]} 2750 ) 1 ( 16657 [ ) 1 ( 3240 {
k
k k d k ak d − + + +
                                           (33) 
Hence, it is rather apparent that a net welfare gain may even arise if the subsidization policy’s 
monitoring and implementation costs are sufficiently low. Consider for instance that the latter 





di w N c −
= ∑ , where c denotes a constant expenditure per unit of Ndi-
subsidized, in the equilibrium.
14  It then easily proves that:  
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14 That is c is needed to be spent per subsidized employee in order the latter to be detected as truly belonging to the -
low reservation wage- group and thus her/his employer to receive the subsidy d.    21
 
Our findings regarding antidiscrimination policy are establishing Proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 2  
a.  To combat wage discrimination, a benevolent policy maker (operating under a balanced 
budget constrain) may alternatively,  
1. Announce a tax 1 R i f f = , per unit of Ndi, which will be imposed to firms i=1, 2, whenever they 
apply the discriminatory wage scheme (a.1 in Proposition 1.).  
2. Issue to firms i=1, 2, a subsidy d s fi − = − = , per unit of Ndi, independently of whether or not 
they apply the discriminatory wage scheme. 
b. Both policies result to non-discriminatory wage rates in the equilibrium. However, while the 
taxation policy always entails a net welfare loss, the subsidization policy may lead to a net 
welfare gain, if it’s monitoring and implementation costs are sufficiently low. Thus, the latter 





  In this paper we have developed a union-oligopoly sectoral framework reasoning wage 
discrimination among equally-skilled workers that, apart from elsewhere, is often observed in the 
(heavily unionized) European labor markets. Under quite regular assumptions regarding union 
behavior and power we have shown that, in the absence of an active antidiscrimination policy, 
wage discrimination is emerging as an (implicit) equilibrium arrangement among firms and 
unions. Three key elements are necessary for that. First, the equally skilled workers must be 
differentiated (grouped) regarding (according to) their reservation wages. Second, unions must 
effectively embody all kinds (groups) of equally skilled workers. Third, collective bargaining 
                                                           
15 Note that, most probably, the last statement in Proposition 2b holds true even if c c > . Unless, there is enough   22
must be decentralized at the firm level. There is adequate evidence that all those elements are 
often met in our reference sector(s). Apart from the open shop scheme (recall footnote 4), firm-
specific collective agreements are taking place in many European labor markets (see, e.g., Hartog 
and Theeuwes [1992]). While, given the above facts, and the European migrant experience over 
the last decades, it is rather unlikely reservation wages to be uniform, even at the firm level.  
  Our analysis, though stylized, turns to be robust along a number of dimensions. First, 
qualitatively similar results would be obtained if we ignore for technological asymmetries among 
firms, allow for a positive upper bound of the reservation wage, consider product differentiation, 
or extent the analysis to the n(>2)-firm oligopoly (and thus subsequently consider the case of 
perfect competition). Moreover, since total cost sub-additivity along with unit cost invariance is 
essentially what drives our results regarding the product market, wage discrimination would also 
emerge under the Bertrand mode of competition. On the other hand, depending on the relative 
weights assigned to each group’s rents, unions may still opt for wage discrimination even if we 
allow for a more “egalitarian” union objective function.   
  As it comes to our considered antidiscrimination policies, we propose that wage 
discrimination can be fought without the latter necessarily ensuing a welfare loss. More 
importantly, our findings imply that a tax announced to deter wage discrimination is rather non-
credible, since it always incurs a loss to the policy makers.
16 Last, but not least, we have shown 
that our suggested subsidization policy would ensue a net welfare gain, provided however that its 
costs are sufficiently low. Hence, our analysis suggests that the E.U-antidiscrimination directives 
may in fact prove to be effective, on both egalitarian and efficiency grounds, insofar as they are 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
reasoning that the subsidization policy’s monitoring and implementation costs are sufficiently higher than their 
counterparts arising from the taxation policy.  
16 Our conjecture is that even if the policy makers’ objective is altered, so as to capture political economy 
considerations, the suggested taxation policy would still  prove to incur a loss to them: Simply because the unions   23
escorted by a financial assistance scheme to policy makers, covering (at least a part of) those 





















                                                                                                                                                                                            
and the firms would definitely oppose that policy, while consumers would be indifferent.   24
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